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- Fix CVE-2023-50387, DNSSEC verification complexity can be exploited to

Browse Source 
exhaust CPU resources and stall DNS resolvers.
This commit is contained in:
W.C.A. Wijngaards 2024-02-13 13:02:08 +01:00
parent 3352b1090e
commit 882903f2fa
14 changed files with 259 additions and 29 deletions
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3
services/authzone.c
View File

@ -7774,6 +7774,7 @@ static int zonemd_dnssec_verify_rrset(struct auth_zone* z,
enum sec_status sec;
struct val_env* ve;
int m;
int verified = 0;
m = modstack_find(mods, "validator");
if(m == -1) {
auth_zone_log(z->name, VERB_ALGO, "zonemd dnssec verify: have "
@ -7797,7 +7798,7 @@ static int zonemd_dnssec_verify_rrset(struct auth_zone* z,
"zonemd: verify %s RRset with DNSKEY", typestr);
}
sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, &pk, dnskey, sigalg, why_bogus, NULL,
LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, NULL);
LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, NULL, &verified);
if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
return 1;
}

3
testcode/unitverify.c
View File

@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ verifytest_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
enum sec_status sec;
char* reason = NULL;
uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
int verified = 0;
if(vsig) {
log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "verify of rrset",
rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type),
@ -188,7 +189,7 @@ verifytest_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
setup_sigalg(dnskey, sigalg); /* check all algorithms in the dnskey */
/* ok to give null as qstate here, won't be used for answer section. */
sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, dnskey, sigalg, &reason, NULL,
LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, NULL);
LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, NULL, &verified);
if(vsig) {
printf("verify outcome is: %s %s\n", sec_status_to_string(sec),
reason?reason:"");

3
testdata/val_any.rpl vendored
View File

@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ SECTION QUESTION
example.com. IN ANY
ENTRY_END
; Allow validation resuming for the RRSIGs
STEP 2 TIME_PASSES ELAPSE 0.05
; recursion happens here.
STEP 10 CHECK_ANSWER
ENTRY_BEGIN

3
testdata/val_any_dname.rpl vendored
View File

@ -164,6 +164,9 @@ SECTION QUESTION
example.com. IN ANY
ENTRY_END
; Allow validation resuming for the RRSIGs
STEP 2 TIME_PASSES ELAPSE 0.05
; recursion happens here.
STEP 10 CHECK_ANSWER
ENTRY_BEGIN

3
testdata/val_any_negcache.rpl vendored
View File

@ -199,6 +199,9 @@ SECTION QUESTION
example.com. IN ANY
ENTRY_END
; Allow validation resuming for the RRSIGs
STEP 21 TIME_PASSES ELAPSE 0.05
; recursion happens here.
STEP 30 CHECK_ANSWER
ENTRY_BEGIN

1
util/fptr_wlist.c
View File

@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ fptr_whitelist_comm_timer(void (*fptr)(void*))
else if(fptr == &pending_udp_timer_delay_cb) return 1;
else if(fptr == &worker_stat_timer_cb) return 1;
else if(fptr == &worker_probe_timer_cb) return 1;
else if(fptr == &validate_msg_signatures_timer_cb) return 1;
#ifdef UB_ON_WINDOWS
else if(fptr == &wsvc_cron_cb) return 1;
#endif

3
validator/val_nsec.c
View File

@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ nsec_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
{
struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
nsec->entry.data;
int verified = 0;
if(!d) return 0;
if(d->security == sec_status_secure)
return 1;
@ -188,7 +189,7 @@ nsec_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
if(d->security == sec_status_secure)
return 1;
d->security = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, nsec, kkey, reason,
reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate);
reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate, &verified);
if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, nsec, *env->now);
return 1;

4
validator/val_nsec3.c
View File

@ -1294,6 +1294,7 @@ list_is_secure(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
{
struct packed_rrset_data* d;
size_t i;
int verified = 0;
for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)list[i]->entry.data;
if(list[i]->rk.type != htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3))
@ -1304,7 +1305,8 @@ list_is_secure(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
if(d->security == sec_status_secure)
continue;
d->security = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, list[i], kkey,
reason, reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate);
reason, reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate,
&verified);
if(d->security != sec_status_secure) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC3 did not verify");
return 0;

37
validator/val_sigcrypt.c
View File

@ -79,6 +79,9 @@
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
/** Maximum number of RRSIG validations for an RRset. */
#define MAX_VALIDATE_RRSIGS 8
/** return number of rrs in an rrset */
static size_t
rrset_get_count(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
@ -542,6 +545,8 @@ int algo_needs_missing(struct algo_needs* n)
* @param reason_bogus: EDE (RFC8914) code paired with the reason of failure.
* @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from.
* @param qstate: qstate with region.
* @param numverified: incremented when the number of RRSIG validations
* increases.
* @return secure if any key signs *this* signature. bogus if no key signs it,
* unchecked on error, or indeterminate if all keys are not supported by
* the crypto library (openssl3+ only).
@ -552,7 +557,8 @@ dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t sig_idx,
struct rbtree_type** sortree,
char** reason, sldns_ede_code *reason_bogus,
sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate)
sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate,
int* numverified)
{
/* find matching keys and check them */
enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus;
@ -576,6 +582,7 @@ dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
tag != dnskey_calc_keytag(dnskey, i))
continue;
numchecked ++;
(*numverified)++;
/* see if key verifies */
sec = dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(env->scratch,
@ -586,6 +593,13 @@ dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
return sec;
else if(sec == sec_status_indeterminate)
numindeterminate ++;
if(*numverified > MAX_VALIDATE_RRSIGS) {
*reason = "too many RRSIG validations";
if(reason_bogus)
*reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "verify sig: too many RRSIG validations");
return sec_status_bogus;
}
}
if(numchecked == 0) {
*reason = "signatures from unknown keys";
@ -609,7 +623,7 @@ enum sec_status
dnskeyset_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey,
uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, sldns_ede_code *reason_bogus,
sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate)
sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate, int* verified)
{
enum sec_status sec;
size_t i, num;
@ -617,6 +631,7 @@ dnskeyset_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
/* make sure that for all DNSKEY algorithms there are valid sigs */
struct algo_needs needs;
int alg;
*verified = 0;
num = rrset_get_sigcount(rrset);
if(num == 0) {
@ -641,7 +656,7 @@ dnskeyset_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(env, ve, *env->now, rrset,
dnskey, i, &sortree, reason, reason_bogus,
section, qstate);
section, qstate, verified);
/* see which algorithm has been fixed up */
if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
if(!sigalg)
@ -653,6 +668,13 @@ dnskeyset_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
(uint8_t)rrset_get_sig_algo(rrset, i));
}
if(*verified > MAX_VALIDATE_RRSIGS) {
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "rrset failed to verify, too many RRSIG validations");
*reason = "too many RRSIG validations";
if(reason_bogus)
*reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
return sec_status_bogus;
}
}
if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "rrset failed to verify: "
@ -691,6 +713,7 @@ dnskey_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
int buf_canon = 0;
uint16_t tag = dnskey_calc_keytag(dnskey, dnskey_idx);
int algo = dnskey_get_algo(dnskey, dnskey_idx);
int numverified = 0;
num = rrset_get_sigcount(rrset);
if(num == 0) {
@ -714,8 +737,16 @@ dnskey_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
if(sec == sec_status_secure)
return sec;
numchecked ++;
numverified ++;
if(sec == sec_status_indeterminate)
numindeterminate ++;
if(numverified > MAX_VALIDATE_RRSIGS) {
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "rrset failed to verify, too many RRSIG validations");
*reason = "too many RRSIG validations";
if(reason_bogus)
*reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
return sec_status_bogus;
}
}
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "rrset failed to verify: all signatures are bogus");
if(!numchecked) {

3
validator/val_sigcrypt.h
View File

@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ uint16_t dnskey_get_flags(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* k, size_t idx);
* @param reason_bogus: EDE (RFC8914) code paired with the reason of failure.
* @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from.
* @param qstate: qstate with region.
* @param verified: if not NULL the number of RRSIG validations is returned.
* @return SECURE if one key in the set verifies one rrsig.
* UNCHECKED on allocation errors, unsupported algorithms, malformed data,
* and BOGUS on verification failures (no keys match any signatures).
@ -268,7 +269,7 @@ enum sec_status dnskeyset_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env,
struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset,
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg,
char** reason, sldns_ede_code *reason_bogus,
sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate);
sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate, int* verified);
/**

22
validator/val_utils.c
View File

@ -58,6 +58,10 @@
#include "sldns/wire2str.h"
#include "sldns/parseutil.h"
/** Maximum allowed digest match failures per DS, for DNSKEYs with the same
* properties */
#define MAX_DS_MATCH_FAILURES 4
enum val_classification
val_classify_response(uint16_t query_flags, struct query_info* origqinf,
struct query_info* qinf, struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
@ -336,7 +340,8 @@ static enum sec_status
val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* keys,
uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, sldns_ede_code *reason_bogus,
sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate)
sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate,
int *verified)
{
enum sec_status sec;
struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
@ -346,6 +351,7 @@ val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset cached",
rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type),
ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
*verified = 0;
return d->security;
}
/* check in the cache if verification has already been done */
@ -354,12 +360,13 @@ val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset from cache",
rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type),
ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
*verified = 0;
return d->security;
}
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset", rrset->rk.dname,
ntohs(rrset->rk.type), ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, keys, sigalg, reason,
reason_bogus, section, qstate);
reason_bogus, section, qstate, verified);
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "verify result: %s", sec_status_to_string(sec));
regional_free_all(env->scratch);
@ -393,7 +400,8 @@ enum sec_status
val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct key_entry_key* kkey,
char** reason, sldns_ede_code *reason_bogus,
sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate)
sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate,
int* verified)
{
/* temporary dnskey rrset-key */
struct ub_packed_rrset_key dnskey;
@ -407,7 +415,7 @@ val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
dnskey.entry.key = &dnskey;
dnskey.entry.data = kd->rrset_data;
sec = val_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, &dnskey, kd->algo, reason,
reason_bogus, section, qstate);
reason_bogus, section, qstate, verified);
return sec;
}
@ -439,6 +447,12 @@ verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
if(!ds_digest_match_dnskey(env, dnskey_rrset, i, ds_rrset,
ds_idx)) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match attempt failed");
if(numchecked > numhashok + MAX_DS_MATCH_FAILURES) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match attempt reached "
"MAX_DS_MATCH_FAILURES (%d); bogus",
MAX_DS_MATCH_FAILURES);
return sec_status_bogus;
}
continue;
}
numhashok++;

4
validator/val_utils.h
View File

@ -124,12 +124,14 @@ void val_find_signer(enum val_classification subtype,
* @param reason_bogus: EDE (RFC8914) code paired with the reason of failure.
* @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from.
* @param qstate: qstate with region.
* @param verified: if not NULL, the number of RRSIG validations is returned.
* @return security status of verification.
*/
enum sec_status val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env,
struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset,
struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason, sldns_ede_code *reason_bogus,
sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate);
sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate,
int* verified);
/**
* Verify DNSKEYs with DS rrset. Like val_verify_new_DNSKEYs but

186
validator/validator.c
View File

@ -64,6 +64,11 @@
#include "sldns/wire2str.h"
#include "sldns/str2wire.h"
/** Max number of RRSIGs to validate at once, suspend query for later. */
#define MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE 8
/** Max number of validation suspends allowed, error out otherwise. */
#define MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS 16
/* forward decl for cache response and normal super inform calls of a DS */
static void process_ds_response(struct module_qstate* qstate,
struct val_qstate* vq, int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg,
@ -292,6 +297,21 @@ val_new(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id)
return val_new_getmsg(qstate, vq);
}
/** reset validator query state for query restart */
static void
val_restart(struct val_qstate* vq)
{
struct comm_timer* temp_timer;
int restart_count;
if(!vq) return;
temp_timer = vq->msg_signatures_timer;
restart_count = vq->restart_count+1;
memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq));
vq->msg_signatures_timer = temp_timer;
vq->restart_count = restart_count;
vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
}
/**
* Exit validation with an error status
*
@ -598,30 +618,42 @@ prime_trust_anchor(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
* completed.
*
* @param qstate: query state.
* @param vq: validator query state.
* @param env: module env for verify.
* @param ve: validator env for verify.
* @param qchase: query that was made.
* @param chase_reply: answer to validate.
* @param key_entry: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
* the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
* @param suspend: returned true if the task takes to long and needs to
* suspend to continue the effort later.
* @return false if any of the rrsets in the an or ns sections of the message
* fail to verify. The message is then set to bogus.
*/
static int
validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct module_env* env,
struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qchase,
struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct key_entry_key* key_entry)
validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qchase,
struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct key_entry_key* key_entry,
int* suspend)
{
uint8_t* sname;
size_t i, slen;
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
enum sec_status sec;
int dname_seen = 0;
int dname_seen = 0, num_verifies = 0, verified, have_state = 0;
char* reason = NULL;
sldns_ede_code reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
*suspend = 0;
if(vq->msg_signatures_state) {
/* Pick up the state, and reset it, may not be needed now. */
vq->msg_signatures_state = 0;
have_state = 1;
}
/* validate the ANSWER section */
for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) {
if(have_state && i <= vq->msg_signatures_index)
continue;
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
/* Skip the CNAME following a (validated) DNAME.
* Because of the normalization routines in the iterator,
@ -640,7 +672,7 @@ validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct module_env* env,
/* Verify the answer rrset */
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason,
&reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate);
&reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate, &verified);
/* If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this
* message is BAD. */
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
@ -665,14 +697,33 @@ validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct module_env* env,
ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
dname_seen = 1;
}
num_verifies += verified;
if(num_verifies > MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE &&
i+1 < (env->cfg->val_clean_additional?
chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets:
chase_reply->rrset_count)) {
/* If the number of RRSIGs exceeds the maximum in
* one go, suspend. Only suspend if there is a next
* rrset to verify, i+1<loopmax. Store where to
* continue later. */
*suspend = 1;
vq->msg_signatures_state = 1;
vq->msg_signatures_index = i;
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "msg signature validation "
"suspended");
return 0;
}
}
/* validate the AUTHORITY section */
for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
if(have_state && i <= vq->msg_signatures_index)
continue;
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason,
&reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate);
&reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate,
&verified);
/* If anything in the authority section fails to be secure,
* we have a bad message. */
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
@ -686,6 +737,18 @@ validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct module_env* env,
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, reason_bogus);
return 0;
}
num_verifies += verified;
if(num_verifies > MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE &&
i+1 < (env->cfg->val_clean_additional?
chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets:
chase_reply->rrset_count)) {
*suspend = 1;
vq->msg_signatures_state = 1;
vq->msg_signatures_index = i;
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "msg signature validation "
"suspended");
return 0;
}
}
/* If set, the validator should clean the additional section of
@ -695,22 +758,102 @@ validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct module_env* env,
/* attempt to validate the ADDITIONAL section rrsets */
for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets;
i<chase_reply->rrset_count; i++) {
if(have_state && i <= vq->msg_signatures_index)
continue;
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
/* only validate rrs that have signatures with the key */
/* leave others unchecked, those get removed later on too */
val_find_rrset_signer(s, &sname, &slen);
verified = 0;
if(sname && query_dname_compare(sname, key_entry->name)==0)
(void)val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry,
&reason, NULL, LDNS_SECTION_ADDITIONAL, qstate);
&reason, NULL, LDNS_SECTION_ADDITIONAL, qstate,
&verified);
/* the additional section can fail to be secure,
* it is optional, check signature in case we need
* to clean the additional section later. */
num_verifies += verified;
if(num_verifies > MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE &&
i+1 < chase_reply->rrset_count) {
*suspend = 1;
vq->msg_signatures_state = 1;
vq->msg_signatures_index = i;
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "msg signature validation "
"suspended");
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
void
validate_msg_signatures_timer_cb(void* arg)
{
struct module_qstate* qstate = (struct module_qstate*)arg;
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate_msg_signatures timer, continue");
mesh_run(qstate->env->mesh, qstate->mesh_info, module_event_pass,
NULL);
}
/** Setup timer to continue validation of msg signatures later */
static int
validate_msg_signatures_setup_timer(struct module_qstate* qstate,
struct val_qstate* vq, int id)
{
struct timeval tv;
int usec, slack, base;
if(vq->suspend_count >= MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate_msg_signatures_setup_timer: "
"reached MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS (%d); error out",
MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS);
errinf(qstate, "max validation suspends reached, "
"too many RRSIG validations");
return 0;
}
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_reply;
if(!vq->msg_signatures_timer) {
vq->msg_signatures_timer = comm_timer_create(
qstate->env->worker_base,
validate_msg_signatures_timer_cb, qstate);
if(!vq->msg_signatures_timer) {
log_err("validate_msg_signatures_setup_timer: "
"out of memory for comm_timer_create");
return 0;
}
}
/* The timer is activated later, after other events in the event
* loop have been processed. The query state can also be deleted,
* when the list is full and query states are dropped. */
/* Extend wait time if there are a lot of queries or if this one
* is taking long, to keep around cpu time for ordinary queries. */
usec = 50000; /* 50 msec */
slack = 0;
if(qstate->env->mesh->all.count >= qstate->env->mesh->max_reply_states)
slack += 3;
else if(qstate->env->mesh->all.count >= qstate->env->mesh->max_reply_states/2)
slack += 2;
else if(qstate->env->mesh->all.count >= qstate->env->mesh->max_reply_states/4)
slack += 1;
if(vq->suspend_count > 3)
slack += 3;
else if(vq->suspend_count > 0)
slack += vq->suspend_count;
if(slack != 0 && slack <= 12 /* No numeric overflow. */) {
usec = usec << slack;
}
/* Spread such timeouts within 90%-100% of the original timer. */
base = usec * 9/10;
usec = base + ub_random_max(qstate->env->rnd, usec-base);
tv.tv_usec = (usec % 1000000);
tv.tv_sec = (usec / 1000000);
vq->suspend_count ++;
comm_timer_set(vq->msg_signatures_timer, &tv);
return 1;
}
/**
* Detect wrong truncated response (say from BIND 9.6.1 that is forwarding
* and saw the NS record without signatures from a referral).
@ -1875,7 +2018,7 @@ processValidate(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
struct val_env* ve, int id)
{
enum val_classification subtype;
int rcode;
int rcode, suspend;
if(!vq->key_entry) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate: no key entry, failed");
@ -1932,8 +2075,14 @@ processValidate(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
/* check signatures in the message;
* answer and authority must be valid, additional is only checked. */
if(!validate_msg_signatures(qstate, qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase,
vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry)) {
if(!validate_msg_signatures(qstate, vq, qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase,
vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, &suspend)) {
if(suspend) {
if(!validate_msg_signatures_setup_timer(qstate, vq,
id))
return val_error(qstate, id);
return 0;
}
/* workaround bad recursor out there that truncates (even
* with EDNS4k) to 512 by removing RRSIG from auth section
* for positive replies*/
@ -2129,16 +2278,13 @@ processFinished(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_bogus) {
/* see if we can try again to fetch data */
if(vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) {
int restart_count = vq->restart_count+1;
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validation failed, "
"blacklist and retry to fetch data");
val_blacklist(&qstate->blacklist, qstate->region,
qstate->reply_origin, 0);
qstate->reply_origin = NULL;
qstate->errinf = NULL;
memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq));
vq->restart_count = restart_count;
vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
val_restart(vq);
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "pass back to next module");
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_restart_next;
return 0;
@ -2476,6 +2622,7 @@ ds_response_to_ke(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
char* reason = NULL;
sldns_ede_code reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
enum val_classification subtype;
int verified;
if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
char rc[16];
rc[0]=0;
@ -2506,7 +2653,7 @@ ds_response_to_ke(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
/* Verify only returns BOGUS or SECURE. If the rrset is
* bogus, then we are done. */
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, ds,
vq->key_entry, &reason, &reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate);
vq->key_entry, &reason, &reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate, &verified);
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS rrset in DS response did "
"not verify");
@ -2652,7 +2799,7 @@ ds_response_to_ke(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
}
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, cname,
vq->key_entry, &reason, &reason_bogus,
LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate);
LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate, &verified);
if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CNAME validated, "
"proof that DS does not exist");
@ -2981,8 +3128,15 @@ val_inform_super(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id,
void
val_clear(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id)
{
struct val_qstate* vq;
if(!qstate)
return;
vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id];
if(vq) {
if(vq->msg_signatures_timer) {
comm_timer_delete(vq->msg_signatures_timer);
}
}
/* everything is allocated in the region, so assign NULL */
qstate->minfo[id] = NULL;
}

13
validator/validator.h
View File

@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct key_cache;
struct key_entry_key;
struct val_neg_cache;
struct config_strlist;
struct comm_timer;
/**
* This is the TTL to use when a trust anchor fails to prime. A trust anchor
@ -215,6 +216,15 @@ struct val_qstate {
/** true if this state is waiting to prime a trust anchor */
int wait_prime_ta;
/** State to continue with RRSIG validation in a message later */
int msg_signatures_state;
/** The rrset index for the msg signatures to continue from */
size_t msg_signatures_index;
/** The timer to resume processing msg signatures */
struct comm_timer* msg_signatures_timer;
/** number of suspends */
int suspend_count;
};
/**
@ -262,4 +272,7 @@ void val_clear(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id);
*/
size_t val_get_mem(struct module_env* env, int id);
/** Timer callback for msg signatures continue timer */
void validate_msg_signatures_timer_cb(void* arg);
#endif /* VALIDATOR_VALIDATOR_H */