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Remove overreaching NSEC rrsets.
git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@1207 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9
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@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
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26 August 2008: Wouter
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- test for insecure zone when DLV is in use, also does negative cache.
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- test for trustanchor when DLV is in use (the anchor works).
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- test for DLV used for a zone below a trustanchor.
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- added scrub filter for overreaching NSEC records and unit test.
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25 August 2008: Wouter
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- realclean patch from Robert Edmonds.
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@ -518,6 +518,35 @@ store_rrset(ldns_buffer* pkt, struct msg_parse* msg, struct module_env* env,
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env->alloc, now);
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}
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/**
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* Check if right hand name in NSEC is within zone
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* @param rrset: the NSEC rrset
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* @param zonename: the zone name.
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* @return true if BAD.
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*/
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static int sanitize_nsec_is_overreach(struct rrset_parse* rrset,
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uint8_t* zonename)
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{
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struct rr_parse* rr;
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uint8_t* rhs;
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size_t len;
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log_assert(rrset->type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC);
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for(rr = rrset->rr_first; rr; rr = rr->next) {
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rhs = rr->ttl_data+4+2;
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len = ldns_read_uint16(rr->ttl_data+4);
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if(!(len=dname_valid(rhs, len))) {
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/* malformed domain name in rdata */
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return 1;
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}
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if(!dname_subdomain_c(rhs, zonename)) {
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/* overreaching */
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return 1;
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}
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}
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/* all NSEC RRs OK */
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* Given a response event, remove suspect RRsets from the response.
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* "Suspect" rrsets are potentially poison. Note that this routine expects
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@ -608,6 +637,13 @@ scrub_sanitize(ldns_buffer* pkt, struct msg_parse* msg,
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continue;
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}
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}
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/* check if right hand side of NSEC is within zone */
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if(rrset->type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC &&
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sanitize_nsec_is_overreach(rrset, zonename)) {
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remove_rrset("sanitize: removing overreaching NSEC "
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"RRset:", pkt, msg, prev, &rrset);
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continue;
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}
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prev = rrset;
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rrset = rrset->rrset_all_next;
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}
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146
testdata/val_nx_overreach.rpl
vendored
Normal file
146
testdata/val_nx_overreach.rpl
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
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; config options
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; The island of trust is at example.com
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server:
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trust-anchor: "example.com. 3600 IN DS 2854 3 1 46e4ffc6e9a4793b488954bd3f0cc6af0dfb201b"
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val-override-date: "20070916134226"
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stub-zone:
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name: "."
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stub-addr: 193.0.14.129 # K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
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CONFIG_END
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SCENARIO_BEGIN Test validator with overreaching NSEC record
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; K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
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RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
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ADDRESS 193.0.14.129
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ENTRY_BEGIN
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MATCH opcode qtype qname
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ADJUST copy_id
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REPLY QR NOERROR
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SECTION QUESTION
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. IN NS
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SECTION ANSWER
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. IN NS K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
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SECTION ADDITIONAL
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K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET. IN A 193.0.14.129
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ENTRY_END
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ENTRY_BEGIN
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MATCH opcode qtype qname
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ADJUST copy_id
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REPLY QR NOERROR
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SECTION QUESTION
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www.example.com. IN A
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SECTION AUTHORITY
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com. IN NS a.gtld-servers.net.
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SECTION ADDITIONAL
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a.gtld-servers.net. IN A 192.5.6.30
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ENTRY_END
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RANGE_END
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; a.gtld-servers.net.
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RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
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ADDRESS 192.5.6.30
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ENTRY_BEGIN
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MATCH opcode qtype qname
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ADJUST copy_id
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REPLY QR NOERROR
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SECTION QUESTION
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com. IN NS
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SECTION ANSWER
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com. IN NS a.gtld-servers.net.
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SECTION ADDITIONAL
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a.gtld-servers.net. IN A 192.5.6.30
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ENTRY_END
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ENTRY_BEGIN
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MATCH opcode qtype qname
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ADJUST copy_id
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REPLY QR NOERROR
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SECTION QUESTION
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www.example.com. IN A
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SECTION AUTHORITY
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example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
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SECTION ADDITIONAL
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ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
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ENTRY_END
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RANGE_END
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; ns.example.com.
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RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
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ADDRESS 1.2.3.4
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ENTRY_BEGIN
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MATCH opcode qtype qname
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ADJUST copy_id
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REPLY QR NOERROR
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SECTION QUESTION
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example.com. IN NS
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SECTION ANSWER
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example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
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example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NS 3 2 3600 20070926134150 20070829134150 2854 example.com. MC0CFQCN+qHdJxoI/2tNKwsb08pra/G7aAIUAWA5sDdJTbrXA1/3OaesGBAO3sI= ;{id = 2854}
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SECTION ADDITIONAL
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ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
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ns.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG A 3 3 3600 20070926135752 20070829135752 2854 example.com. MC0CFQCMSWxVehgOQLoYclB9PIAbNP229AIUeH0vNNGJhjnZiqgIOKvs1EhzqAo= ;{id = 2854}
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ENTRY_END
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; response to DNSKEY priming query
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ENTRY_BEGIN
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MATCH opcode qtype qname
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ADJUST copy_id
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REPLY QR NOERROR
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SECTION QUESTION
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example.com. IN DNSKEY
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SECTION ANSWER
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example.com. 3600 IN DNSKEY 256 3 3 ALXLUsWqUrY3JYER3T4TBJII s70j+sDS/UT2QRp61SE7S3E EXopNXoFE73JLRmvpi/UrOO/Vz4Se 6wXv/CYCKjGw06U4WRgR YXcpEhJROyNapmdIKSx hOzfLVE1gqA0PweZR8d tY3aNQSRn3sPpwJr6Mi /PqQKAMMrZ9ckJpf1+b QMOOvxgzz2U1GS18b3y ZKcgTMEaJzd/GZYzi/B N2DzQ0MsrSwYXfsNLFO Bbs8PJMW4LYIxeeOe6rUgkWOF 7CC9Dh/dduQ1QrsJhmZAEFfd6ByYV+ ;{id = 2854 (zsk), size = 1688b}
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example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 3 2 3600 20070926134802 20070829134802 2854 example.com. MCwCFG1yhRNtTEa3Eno2zhVVuy2EJX3wAhQeLyUp6+UXcpC5qGNu9tkrTEgPUg== ;{id = 2854}
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SECTION AUTHORITY
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example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
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example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NS 3 2 3600 20070926134150 20070829134150 2854 example.com. MC0CFQCN+qHdJxoI/2tNKwsb08pra/G7aAIUAWA5sDdJTbrXA1/3OaesGBAO3sI= ;{id = 2854}
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SECTION ADDITIONAL
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ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
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ns.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG A 3 3 3600 20070926135752 20070829135752 2854 example.com. MC0CFQCMSWxVehgOQLoYclB9PIAbNP229AIUeH0vNNGJhjnZiqgIOKvs1EhzqAo= ;{id = 2854}
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ENTRY_END
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; response to query of interest
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ENTRY_BEGIN
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MATCH opcode qtype qname
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ADJUST copy_id
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REPLY QR NXDOMAIN
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SECTION QUESTION
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www.example.com. IN A
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SECTION ANSWER
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SECTION AUTHORITY
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example.com. IN SOA ns.example.com. hostmaster.example.com. 2007090400 28800 7200 604800 18000
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example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG SOA 3 2 3600 20070926134150 20070829134150 2854 example.com. MC0CFCNGZ+/OfElYQMCZ77O9Lw9rhk7PAhUAmDcvTAst6Bq83qPq3r6c/Dm1nFc= ;{id = 2854}
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; wildcard denial
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example.com. IN NSEC abc.example.com. SOA NS DNSKEY NSEC RRSIG
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example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NSEC 3 2 3600 20070926134150 20070829134150 2854 example.com. MCwCFHV2IBWyTmDJvZ+sT+WsGrJX0op/AhQkAijjnjPAtx/tNub2FAGqcexJSg== ;{id = 2854}
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; qname denial
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; The overreaching NSEC record; it tries to deny other .com zones!
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wab.example.com. IN NSEC wzz.foo.com. A NSEC RRSIG
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wab.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NSEC 3 3 3600 20070926134150 20070829134150 2854 example.com. AEimIB2N5u7AQOb5IBMnckASZ4MlhBxziJy+zVUjLov/s7q85j8eWQc= ;{id = 2854}
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SECTION ADDITIONAL
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ENTRY_END
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RANGE_END
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STEP 1 QUERY
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ENTRY_BEGIN
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REPLY RD DO
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SECTION QUESTION
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www.example.com. IN A
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ENTRY_END
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; recursion happens here.
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STEP 10 CHECK_ANSWER
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ENTRY_BEGIN
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MATCH all
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REPLY QR RD RA SERVFAIL
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SECTION QUESTION
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www.example.com. IN A
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SECTION ANSWER
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SECTION AUTHORITY
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SECTION ADDITIONAL
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ENTRY_END
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SCENARIO_END
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