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Remove overreaching NSEC rrsets.

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git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@1207 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9
This commit is contained in:
Wouter Wijngaards 2008-08-26 10:32:46 +00:00
parent fcbc34bd7f
commit 82ce090a35
3 changed files with 188 additions and 0 deletions
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6
doc/Changelog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
26 August 2008: Wouter
- test for insecure zone when DLV is in use, also does negative cache.
- test for trustanchor when DLV is in use (the anchor works).
- test for DLV used for a zone below a trustanchor.
- added scrub filter for overreaching NSEC records and unit test.
25 August 2008: Wouter 25 August 2008: Wouter
- realclean patch from Robert Edmonds. - realclean patch from Robert Edmonds.

36
iterator/iter_scrub.c
View File

@ -518,6 +518,35 @@ store_rrset(ldns_buffer* pkt, struct msg_parse* msg, struct module_env* env,
env->alloc, now); env->alloc, now);
} }
/**
* Check if right hand name in NSEC is within zone
* @param rrset: the NSEC rrset
* @param zonename: the zone name.
* @return true if BAD.
*/
static int sanitize_nsec_is_overreach(struct rrset_parse* rrset,
uint8_t* zonename)
{
struct rr_parse* rr;
uint8_t* rhs;
size_t len;
log_assert(rrset->type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC);
for(rr = rrset->rr_first; rr; rr = rr->next) {
rhs = rr->ttl_data+4+2;
len = ldns_read_uint16(rr->ttl_data+4);
if(!(len=dname_valid(rhs, len))) {
/* malformed domain name in rdata */
return 1;
}
if(!dname_subdomain_c(rhs, zonename)) {
/* overreaching */
return 1;
}
}
/* all NSEC RRs OK */
return 0;
}
/** /**
* Given a response event, remove suspect RRsets from the response. * Given a response event, remove suspect RRsets from the response.
* "Suspect" rrsets are potentially poison. Note that this routine expects * "Suspect" rrsets are potentially poison. Note that this routine expects
@ -608,6 +637,13 @@ scrub_sanitize(ldns_buffer* pkt, struct msg_parse* msg,
continue; continue;
} }
} }
/* check if right hand side of NSEC is within zone */
if(rrset->type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC &&
sanitize_nsec_is_overreach(rrset, zonename)) {
remove_rrset("sanitize: removing overreaching NSEC "
"RRset:", pkt, msg, prev, &rrset);
continue;
}
prev = rrset; prev = rrset;
rrset = rrset->rrset_all_next; rrset = rrset->rrset_all_next;
} }

146
testdata/val_nx_overreach.rpl vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
; config options
; The island of trust is at example.com
server:
trust-anchor: "example.com. 3600 IN DS 2854 3 1 46e4ffc6e9a4793b488954bd3f0cc6af0dfb201b"
val-override-date: "20070916134226"
stub-zone:
name: "."
stub-addr: 193.0.14.129 # K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
CONFIG_END
SCENARIO_BEGIN Test validator with overreaching NSEC record
; K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
ADDRESS 193.0.14.129
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
. IN NS
SECTION ANSWER
. IN NS K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET. IN A 193.0.14.129
ENTRY_END
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
www.example.com. IN A
SECTION AUTHORITY
com. IN NS a.gtld-servers.net.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
a.gtld-servers.net. IN A 192.5.6.30
ENTRY_END
RANGE_END
; a.gtld-servers.net.
RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
ADDRESS 192.5.6.30
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
com. IN NS
SECTION ANSWER
com. IN NS a.gtld-servers.net.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
a.gtld-servers.net. IN A 192.5.6.30
ENTRY_END
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
www.example.com. IN A
SECTION AUTHORITY
example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
ENTRY_END
RANGE_END
; ns.example.com.
RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
ADDRESS 1.2.3.4
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
example.com. IN NS
SECTION ANSWER
example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NS 3 2 3600 20070926134150 20070829134150 2854 example.com. MC0CFQCN+qHdJxoI/2tNKwsb08pra/G7aAIUAWA5sDdJTbrXA1/3OaesGBAO3sI= ;{id = 2854}
SECTION ADDITIONAL
ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
ns.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG A 3 3 3600 20070926135752 20070829135752 2854 example.com. MC0CFQCMSWxVehgOQLoYclB9PIAbNP229AIUeH0vNNGJhjnZiqgIOKvs1EhzqAo= ;{id = 2854}
ENTRY_END
; response to DNSKEY priming query
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
example.com. IN DNSKEY
SECTION ANSWER
example.com. 3600 IN DNSKEY 256 3 3 ALXLUsWqUrY3JYER3T4TBJII s70j+sDS/UT2QRp61SE7S3E EXopNXoFE73JLRmvpi/UrOO/Vz4Se 6wXv/CYCKjGw06U4WRgR YXcpEhJROyNapmdIKSx hOzfLVE1gqA0PweZR8d tY3aNQSRn3sPpwJr6Mi /PqQKAMMrZ9ckJpf1+b QMOOvxgzz2U1GS18b3y ZKcgTMEaJzd/GZYzi/B N2DzQ0MsrSwYXfsNLFO Bbs8PJMW4LYIxeeOe6rUgkWOF 7CC9Dh/dduQ1QrsJhmZAEFfd6ByYV+ ;{id = 2854 (zsk), size = 1688b}
example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 3 2 3600 20070926134802 20070829134802 2854 example.com. MCwCFG1yhRNtTEa3Eno2zhVVuy2EJX3wAhQeLyUp6+UXcpC5qGNu9tkrTEgPUg== ;{id = 2854}
SECTION AUTHORITY
example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NS 3 2 3600 20070926134150 20070829134150 2854 example.com. MC0CFQCN+qHdJxoI/2tNKwsb08pra/G7aAIUAWA5sDdJTbrXA1/3OaesGBAO3sI= ;{id = 2854}
SECTION ADDITIONAL
ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
ns.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG A 3 3 3600 20070926135752 20070829135752 2854 example.com. MC0CFQCMSWxVehgOQLoYclB9PIAbNP229AIUeH0vNNGJhjnZiqgIOKvs1EhzqAo= ;{id = 2854}
ENTRY_END
; response to query of interest
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR NXDOMAIN
SECTION QUESTION
www.example.com. IN A
SECTION ANSWER
SECTION AUTHORITY
example.com. IN SOA ns.example.com. hostmaster.example.com. 2007090400 28800 7200 604800 18000
example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG SOA 3 2 3600 20070926134150 20070829134150 2854 example.com. MC0CFCNGZ+/OfElYQMCZ77O9Lw9rhk7PAhUAmDcvTAst6Bq83qPq3r6c/Dm1nFc= ;{id = 2854}
; wildcard denial
example.com. IN NSEC abc.example.com. SOA NS DNSKEY NSEC RRSIG
example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NSEC 3 2 3600 20070926134150 20070829134150 2854 example.com. MCwCFHV2IBWyTmDJvZ+sT+WsGrJX0op/AhQkAijjnjPAtx/tNub2FAGqcexJSg== ;{id = 2854}
; qname denial
; The overreaching NSEC record; it tries to deny other .com zones!
wab.example.com. IN NSEC wzz.foo.com. A NSEC RRSIG
wab.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NSEC 3 3 3600 20070926134150 20070829134150 2854 example.com. AEimIB2N5u7AQOb5IBMnckASZ4MlhBxziJy+zVUjLov/s7q85j8eWQc= ;{id = 2854}
SECTION ADDITIONAL
ENTRY_END
RANGE_END
STEP 1 QUERY
ENTRY_BEGIN
REPLY RD DO
SECTION QUESTION
www.example.com. IN A
ENTRY_END
; recursion happens here.
STEP 10 CHECK_ANSWER
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH all
REPLY QR RD RA SERVFAIL
SECTION QUESTION
www.example.com. IN A
SECTION ANSWER
SECTION AUTHORITY
SECTION ADDITIONAL
ENTRY_END
SCENARIO_END