0x20 document, checkconf fix.

git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@1037 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9
This commit is contained in:
Wouter Wijngaards 2008-04-14 14:48:17 +00:00
parent dccc665658
commit 2f7bd77250
6 changed files with 144 additions and 27 deletions

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@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
14 April 2008: Wouter
- got update for parseunbound.pl statistics script from Kai Storbeck.
- tpkg tests for udp wait list.
- documented 0x20 status.
- fixup chroot and checkconf, it is much smarter now.
11 April 2008: Wouter
- random port selection out of the configged ports.

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@ -46,3 +46,4 @@ o (option) for extended statistics. If enabled (not by default) collect print
bits(RD, CD, DO, EDNS-present, AD)query, (Secure, Bogus)reply.
o overhaul outside-network servicedquery to merge with udpwait and tcpwait,
to make timers in servicedquery independent of udpwait queues.
o 0x20 fallback so it can be enabled without trouble.

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@ -211,6 +211,8 @@ server:
# Disabled by default, because some caching forwarders may not
# support this (if you have forward-zones). Most authority servers do.
# This feature is an experimental implementation of draft dns-0x20.
# It is known that some authority servers do not support 0x20, and
# resolution will fail for them. A solution is on the TODO list.
# use-caps-for-id: no
# Do not query the following addresses. No DNS queries are sent there.

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@ -345,10 +345,9 @@ downgrade attack that disables security for a zone. Default is on.
Use 0x20-encoded random bits in the query to foil spoof attempts.
This perturbs the lowercase and uppercase of query names sent to
authority servers and checks if the reply still has the correct casing.
Use together with a large outgoing port range to obtain a high spoof resistance.
Disabled by default, because some caching forwarders may not
support this. If you have no forward\-zones it should be possible to enable
this without problem, it works with most authority servers.
support this. It is known that some authority servers do not support 0x20,
and resolution will fail for them. A solution is on the TODO list.
This feature is an experimental implementation of draft dns\-0x20.
.TP
.B do\-not\-query\-address: \fI<IP address>
@ -631,7 +630,7 @@ server:
num\-threads: 1
outgoing\-num\-tcp: 1 # this limits TCP service, uses less buffers.
incoming\-num\-tcp: 1
outgoing\-range: 1 # uses less memory, but less port randomness.
outgoing\-range: 16 # uses less memory, but less performance.
msg\-buffer\-size: 8192 # note this limits service, 'no huge stuff'.
msg\-cache\-size: 100k
msg\-cache\-slabs: 1

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@ -52,6 +52,9 @@
#include "validator/validator.h"
#include "services/localzone.h"
#include <pwd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
#include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
/** Give checkconf usage, and exit (1). */
static void
@ -171,18 +174,117 @@ aclchecks(struct config_file* cfg)
}
}
/** true if fname is a file */
static int
is_file(const char* fname)
{
struct stat buf;
if(stat(fname, &buf) < 0) {
if(errno==EACCES) {
printf("warning: no search permission for one of the directories in path: %s\n", fname);
return 1;
}
perror(fname);
return 0;
}
if(S_ISDIR(buf.st_mode)) {
printf("%s is not a file\n", fname);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/** true if fname is a directory */
static int
is_dir(const char* fname)
{
struct stat buf;
if(stat(fname, &buf) < 0) {
if(errno==EACCES) {
printf("warning: no search permission for one of the directories in path: %s\n", fname);
return 1;
}
perror(fname);
return 0;
}
if(!(S_ISDIR(buf.st_mode))) {
printf("%s is not a directory\n", fname);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/** convert a filename to full pathname in original filesys. return static */
static char*
fname_after_chroot(const char* fname, struct config_file* cfg, int use_chdir)
{
static char buf[1024];
int slashit = 0;
buf[0] = 0;
if(cfg->chrootdir && cfg->chrootdir[0] &&
strncmp(cfg->chrootdir, fname, strlen(cfg->chrootdir)) == 0) {
/* already full pathname, return it */
strncpy(buf, fname, sizeof(buf)-1);
buf[sizeof(buf)-1] = 0;
return buf;
}
/* chroot */
if(cfg->chrootdir && cfg->chrootdir[0]) {
/* start with chrootdir */
strncpy(buf, cfg->chrootdir, sizeof(buf)-1);
slashit = 1;
}
/* chdir */
if(fname[0] == '/' || !use_chdir) {
/* full path, no chdir */
} else if(cfg->directory && cfg->directory[0]) {
/* prepend chdir */
if(slashit && cfg->directory[0] != '/')
strncat(buf, "/", sizeof(buf)-1);
if(strncmp(cfg->chrootdir, cfg->directory,
strlen(cfg->chrootdir)) == 0)
strncat(buf, cfg->directory+strlen(cfg->chrootdir),
sizeof(buf)-1);
else strncat(buf, cfg->directory, sizeof(buf)-1);
slashit = 1;
}
/* fname */
if(slashit && fname[0] != '/')
strncat(buf, "/", sizeof(buf)-1);
strncat(buf, fname, sizeof(buf)-1);
buf[sizeof(buf)-1] = 0;
return buf;
}
/** get base dir of a fname */
static char*
basedir(const char* fname, struct config_file* cfg)
{
char* d = fname_after_chroot(fname, cfg, 1);
char* rev = strrchr(d, '/');
if(!rev) return NULL;
if(d == rev) return NULL;
rev[0] = 0;
return d;
}
/** check file list, every file must be inside the chroot location */
static void
check_chroot_filelist(const char* desc, struct config_strlist* list,
const char* chrootdir)
const char* chrootdir, struct config_file* cfg)
{
struct config_strlist* p;
if(!chrootdir) return;
char* old;
for(p=list; p; p=p->next) {
if(p->str && p->str[0] && strncmp(chrootdir, p->str,
strlen(chrootdir)) != 0) {
fatal_exit("%s: \"%s\" not in chrootdir %s",
desc, p->str, chrootdir);
if(p->str && p->str[0]) {
if(!is_file(fname_after_chroot(p->str, cfg, 1))) {
fatal_exit("%s: \"%s\" does not exist in chrootdir %s",
desc, p->str, chrootdir);
}
old = p->str;
/* put in a new full path for continued checking */
p->str = strdup(fname_after_chroot(p->str, cfg, 1));
free(old);
}
}
}
@ -209,26 +311,37 @@ morechecks(struct config_file* cfg)
cfg->chrootdir[strlen(cfg->chrootdir)-1] == '/')
fatal_exit("chootdir %s has trailing slash '/' please remove.",
cfg->chrootdir);
if(cfg->chrootdir && strncmp(cfg->chrootdir, cfg->directory,
strlen(cfg->chrootdir)) != 0)
fatal_exit("working directory %s not in chrootdir %s",
cfg->directory, cfg->chrootdir);
if(cfg->chrootdir && cfg->pidfile && cfg->pidfile[0] &&
strncmp(cfg->chrootdir, cfg->pidfile,
strlen(cfg->chrootdir)) != 0)
fatal_exit("pid file %s not in chrootdir %s",
cfg->pidfile, cfg->chrootdir);
if(cfg->chrootdir && cfg->logfile && cfg->logfile[0] &&
strncmp(cfg->chrootdir, cfg->logfile,
strlen(cfg->chrootdir)) != 0)
fatal_exit("log file %s not in chrootdir %s",
cfg->logfile, cfg->chrootdir);
if(cfg->chrootdir && cfg->chrootdir[0] &&
!is_dir(cfg->chrootdir)) {
fatal_exit("bad chroot directory");
}
if(cfg->directory && cfg->directory[0] &&
!is_dir(fname_after_chroot(cfg->directory, cfg, 0))) {
fatal_exit("bad chdir directory");
}
if( (cfg->chrootdir && cfg->chrootdir[0]) ||
(cfg->directory && cfg->directory[0])) {
if(cfg->pidfile && cfg->pidfile[0] &&
basedir(cfg->pidfile, cfg) &&
!is_dir(basedir(cfg->pidfile, cfg))) {
fatal_exit("pidfile directory does not exist");
}
if(cfg->logfile && cfg->logfile[0] &&
basedir(cfg->logfile, cfg) &&
!is_dir(basedir(cfg->logfile, cfg))) {
fatal_exit("pidfile directory does not exist");
}
}
check_chroot_filelist("file with root-hints",
cfg->root_hints, cfg->chrootdir);
cfg->root_hints, cfg->chrootdir, cfg);
check_chroot_filelist("trust-anchor-file",
cfg->trust_anchor_file_list, cfg->chrootdir);
cfg->trust_anchor_file_list, cfg->chrootdir, cfg);
check_chroot_filelist("trusted-keys-file",
cfg->trusted_keys_file_list, cfg->chrootdir);
cfg->trusted_keys_file_list, cfg->chrootdir, cfg);
/* remove chroot setting so that modules are not stripping pathnames*/
free(cfg->chrootdir);
cfg->chrootdir = NULL;
if(strcmp(cfg->module_conf, "iterator") != 0 &&
strcmp(cfg->module_conf, "validator iterator") != 0) {

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