unbound/validator/validator.c

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/*
* validator/validator.c - secure validator DNS query response module
*
* Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
*
* This software is open source.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may
* be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/**
* \file
*
* This file contains a module that performs validation of DNS queries.
* According to RFC 4034.
*/
#include "config.h"
#include "validator/validator.h"
#include "validator/val_anchor.h"
#include "validator/val_kcache.h"
#include "validator/val_kentry.h"
#include "validator/val_utils.h"
#include "validator/val_nsec.h"
#include "services/cache/dns.h"
#include "util/data/dname.h"
#include "util/module.h"
#include "util/log.h"
#include "util/net_help.h"
#include "util/region-allocator.h"
#include "util/config_file.h"
/** apply config settings to validator */
static int
val_apply_cfg(struct val_env* val_env, struct config_file* cfg)
{
if(!val_env->anchors)
val_env->anchors = anchors_create();
if(!val_env->anchors) {
log_err("out of memory");
return 0;
}
if(!val_env->kcache)
val_env->kcache = key_cache_create(cfg);
if(!val_env->kcache) {
log_err("out of memory");
return 0;
}
if(!anchors_apply_cfg(val_env->anchors, cfg)) {
log_err("validator: error in trustanchors config");
return 0;
}
val_env->date_override = cfg->val_date_override;
return 1;
}
/** validator init */
static int
val_init(struct module_env* env, int id)
{
struct val_env* val_env = (struct val_env*)calloc(1,
sizeof(struct val_env));
if(!val_env) {
log_err("malloc failure");
return 0;
}
env->modinfo[id] = (void*)val_env;
if(!val_apply_cfg(val_env, env->cfg)) {
log_err("validator: could not apply configuration settings.");
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/** validator deinit */
static void
val_deinit(struct module_env* env, int id)
{
struct val_env* val_env;
if(!env || !env->modinfo || !env->modinfo[id])
return;
val_env = (struct val_env*)env->modinfo[id];
anchors_delete(val_env->anchors);
key_cache_delete(val_env->kcache);
free(val_env);
}
/** allocate new validator query state */
static struct val_qstate*
val_new(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id)
{
struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)region_alloc(
qstate->region, sizeof(*vq));
log_assert(!qstate->minfo[id]);
if(!vq)
return NULL;
memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq));
qstate->minfo[id] = vq;
vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
if(!qstate->return_msg || qstate->return_rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
/* create a message to verify */
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "constructing reply for validation");
vq->orig_msg = (struct dns_msg*)region_alloc(qstate->region,
sizeof(struct dns_msg));
if(!vq->orig_msg)
return NULL;
vq->orig_msg->qinfo = qstate->qinfo;
vq->orig_msg->rep = (struct reply_info*)region_alloc(
qstate->region, sizeof(struct reply_info));
if(!vq->orig_msg->rep)
return NULL;
memset(vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, sizeof(struct reply_info));
vq->orig_msg->rep->flags = (uint16_t)(qstate->return_rcode&0xf)
|BIT_QR|BIT_RA|(qstate->query_flags|(BIT_CD|BIT_RD));
vq->orig_msg->rep->qdcount = 1;
} else {
vq->orig_msg = qstate->return_msg;
}
vq->qchase = qstate->qinfo;
vq->chase_reply = vq->orig_msg->rep;
return vq;
}
/**
* Exit validation with an error status
*
* @param qstate: query state
* @param id: validator id.
* @return false, for use by caller to return to stop processing.
*/
static int
val_error(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id)
{
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error;
qstate->return_rcode = LDNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL;
return 0;
}
/**
* Check to see if a given response needs to go through the validation
* process. Typical reasons for this routine to return false are: CD bit was
* on in the original request, the response was already validated, or the
* response is a kind of message that is unvalidatable (i.e., SERVFAIL,
* REFUSED, etc.)
*
* @param qstate: query state.
* @param vq: validator query state.
* @return true if the response could use validation (although this does not
* mean we can actually validate this response).
*/
static int
needs_validation(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq)
{
int rcode;
/* If the CD bit is on in the original request, then we don't bother to
* validate anything.*/
if(qstate->query_flags & BIT_CD) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "not validating response due to CD bit");
return 0;
}
/* validate unchecked, and re-validate bogus messages */
if (vq->orig_msg->rep->security > sec_status_bogus)
{
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "response has already been validated");
return 0;
}
rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(vq->orig_msg->rep->flags);
if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate non-answer, rcode %s",
ldns_lookup_by_id(ldns_rcodes, rcode)?
ldns_lookup_by_id(ldns_rcodes, rcode)->name:"??");
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/**
* Generate a request for DNS data.
*
* @param qstate: query state that is the parent.
* @param id: module id.
* @param name: what name to query for.
* @param namelen: length of name.
* @param qtype: query type.
* @param qclass: query class.
* @return false on alloc failure.
*/
static int
generate_request(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, uint8_t* name,
size_t namelen, uint16_t qtype, uint16_t qclass)
{
struct module_qstate* newq;
struct query_info ask;
ask.qname = name;
ask.qname_len = namelen;
ask.qtype = qtype;
ask.qclass = qclass;
log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "generate request", &ask);
if(!(*qstate->env->attach_sub)(qstate, &ask,
(uint16_t)(BIT_RD|BIT_CD), 0, &newq)){
log_err("Could not generate request: out of memory");
return 0;
}
/* ignore newq; validator does not need state created for that
* query, and its a 'normal' for iterator as well */
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_subquery;
return 1;
}
/**
* Prime trust anchor for use.
* Generate and dispatch a priming query for the given trust anchor.
* The trust anchor can be DNSKEY or DS and does not have to be signed.
*
* @param qstate: query state.
* @param vq: validator query state.
* @param id: module id.
* @param toprime: what to prime.
* @return false on a processing error.
*/
static int
prime_trust_anchor(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
int id, struct trust_anchor* toprime)
{
int ret = generate_request(qstate, id, toprime->name, toprime->namelen,
LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, toprime->dclass);
if(!ret) {
log_err("Could not prime trust anchor: out of memory");
return 0;
}
/* ignore newq; validator does not need state created for that
* query, and its a 'normal' for iterator as well */
vq->wait_prime_ta = 1; /* to elicit PRIME_RESP_STATE processing
from the validator inform_super() routine */
return 1;
}
/**
* Given a "positive" response -- a response that contains an answer to the
* question, and no CNAME chain, validate this response. This generally
* consists of verifying the answer RRset and the authority RRsets.
*
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
* completed.
*
* @param env: module env for verify.
* @param ve: validator env for verify.
* @param qchase: query that was made.
* @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
* @param key_entry: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
* the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
*/
static void
validate_positive_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
struct key_entry_key* key_entry)
{
uint8_t* wc = NULL;
int wc_NSEC_ok = 0;
int dname_seen = 0;
int nsec3s_seen = 0;
size_t i;
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
enum sec_status sec;
/* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself */
for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) {
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
/* Skip the CNAME following a (validated) DNAME.
* Because of the normalization routines in the iterator,
* there will always be an unsigned CNAME following a DNAME
* (unless qtype=DNAME). */
if(dname_seen && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) {
dname_seen = 0;
continue;
}
/* Verify the answer rrset */
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry);
/* If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this
* message is BAD. */
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "Positive response has "
"failed ANSWER rrset: ", s->rk.dname,
ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
return;
}
/* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard
* expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be
* made in the authority section. */
if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc)) {
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "Positive response has "
"inconsistent wildcard sigs: ", s->rk.dname,
ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
return;
}
/* Notice a DNAME that should be followed by an unsigned
* CNAME. */
if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME &&
ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
dname_seen = 1;
}
}
/* validate the AUTHORITY section as well - this will generally be
* the NS rrset (which could be missing, no problem) */
for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry);
/* If anything in the authority section fails to be secure,
* we have a bad message. */
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "Positive response has "
"failed AUTHORITY rrset: ", s->rk.dname,
ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
return;
}
/* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a
* (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove
* that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard
* was used. */
if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) {
wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
}
/* if not, continue looking for proof */
}
/* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and
* we have NSEC3 records */
if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
nsec3s_seen = 1;
}
}
/* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already
* proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3
* records. */
if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen) {
/* TODO NSEC3 positive wildcard proof */
/* possibly: wc_NSEC_ok = 1; */
}
/* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard
* response, fail. */
if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "positive response was wildcard "
"expansion and did not prove original data "
"did not exist");
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
return;
}
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated positive response");
chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
}
/**
* Validate a NOERROR/NODATA signed response -- a response that has a
* NOERROR Rcode but no ANSWER section RRsets. This consists of verifying
* the authority section rrsets and making certain that the authority
* section NSEC/NSEC3s proves that the qname does exist and the qtype doesn't.
*
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
* completed.
*
* @param env: module env for verify.
* @param ve: validator env for verify.
* @param qchase: query that was made.
* @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
* @param key_entry: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
* the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
*/
static void
validate_nodata_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
struct key_entry_key* key_entry)
{
/* Since we are here, there must be nothing in the ANSWER section to
* validate. */
/* (Note: CNAME/DNAME responses will not directly get here --
* instead they are broken down into individual CNAME/DNAME/final answer
* responses. - TODO this will change though) */
/* validate the AUTHORITY section */
int has_valid_nsec = 0; /* If true, then the NODATA has been proven.*/
uint8_t* ce = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. This is the
proven closest encloser. */
uint8_t* wc = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. wildcard nsec */
int nsec3s_seen = 0; /* nsec3s seen */
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
enum sec_status sec;
size_t i;
for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry);
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "NODATA response has "
"failed AUTHORITY rrset: ", s->rk.dname,
ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
return;
}
/* If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove
* NODATA.
* This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case. */
if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
if(nsec_proves_nodata(s, qchase)) {
has_valid_nsec = 1;
if(dname_is_wild(s->rk.dname))
wc = s->rk.dname;
}
if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) {
ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s);
}
} else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
nsec3s_seen = 1;
}
}
/* check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof. */
/* The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exists
* (and also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC
* showing the matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser. */
if(wc && !ce)
has_valid_nsec = 0;
else if(wc && ce) {
log_assert(dname_is_wild(wc));
/* first label wc is \001*, so remove and compare to ce */
if(query_dname_compare(wc+2, ce) != 0) {
has_valid_nsec = 0;
}
}
if(!has_valid_nsec && nsec3s_seen) {
/* TODO handle NSEC3 proof here */
/* and set has_valid_nsec=1; if so */
}
if(!has_valid_nsec) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NODATA response failed to prove NODATA "
"status with NSEC/NSEC3");
if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO)
log_dns_msg("Failed NODATA", qchase, chase_reply);
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
return;
}
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated NODATA response.");
chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
}
/**
* Validate a NAMEERROR signed response -- a response that has a NXDOMAIN
* Rcode. This consists of verifying the authority section rrsets and making
* certain that the authority section NSEC proves that the qname doesn't
* exist and the covering wildcard also doesn't exist..
*
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
* completed.
*
* @param env: module env for verify.
* @param ve: validator env for verify.
* @param qchase: query that was made.
* @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
* @param key_entry: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
* the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
*/
static void
validate_nameerror_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
struct key_entry_key* key_entry)
{
/* FIXME: should we check to see if there is anything in the answer
* section? if so, what should the result be? */
int has_valid_nsec = 0;
int has_valid_wnsec = 0;
int nsec3s_seen = 0;
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
enum sec_status sec;
size_t i;
for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry);
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "NameError response has "
"failed AUTHORITY rrset: ", s->rk.dname,
ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
return;
}
if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname))
has_valid_nsec = 1;
if(val_nsec_proves_no_wc(s, qchase->qname,
qchase->qname_len))
has_valid_wnsec = 1;
} else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3)
nsec3s_seen = 1;
}
if(!has_valid_nsec || !has_valid_wnsec) {
/* TODO: use NSEC3 proof */
}
/* If the message fails to prove either condition, it is bogus. */
if(!has_valid_nsec) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NameError response has failed to prove: "
"qname does not exist");
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
return;
}
if(!has_valid_wnsec) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NameError response has failed to prove: "
"covering wildcard does not exist");
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
return;
}
/* Otherwise, we consider the message secure. */
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated NAME ERROR response.");
chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
}
/**
* Given an "ANY" response -- a response that contains an answer to a
* qtype==ANY question, with answers. This consists of simply verifying all
* present answer/auth RRsets, with no checking that all types are present.
*
* NOTE: it may be possible to get parent-side delegation point records
* here, which won't all be signed. Right now, this routine relies on the
* upstream iterative resolver to not return these responses -- instead
* treating them as referrals.
*
* NOTE: RFC 4035 is silent on this issue, so this may change upon
* clarification.
*
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
* completed.
*
* @param env: module env for verify.
* @param ve: validator env for verify.
* @param qchase: query that was made.
* @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
* @param key_entry: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
* the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
*/
static void
validate_any_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
struct key_entry_key* key_entry)
{
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
enum sec_status sec;
size_t i;
if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY) {
log_err("internal error: ANY validation called for non-ANY");
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
return;
}
/* validate the ANSWER section. */
for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) {
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry);
/* If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this
* message is BAD. */
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "ANY response has "
"failed ANSWER rrset: ", s->rk.dname,
ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
return;
}
}
/* validate the AUTHORITY section as well - this will be the NS rrset
* (which could be missing, no problem) */
for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry);
/* If anything in the authority section fails to be
* secure, we have a bad message. */
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "ANY response has "
"failed AUTHORITY rrset: ", s->rk.dname,
ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
return;
}
}
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated positive ANY response");
chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
}
/**
* Process init state for validator.
* Process the INIT state. First tier responses start in the INIT state.
* This is where they are vetted for validation suitability, and the initial
* key search is done.
*
* Currently, events the come through this routine will be either promoted
* to FINISHED/CNAME_RESP (no validation needed), FINDKEY (next step to
* validation), or will be (temporarily) retired and a new priming request
* event will be generated.
*
* @param qstate: query state.
* @param vq: validator query state.
* @param ve: validator shared global environment.
* @param id: module id.
* @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if
* not.
*/
static int
processInit(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
struct val_env* ve, int id)
{
uint8_t* lookup_name;
size_t lookup_len;
if(!needs_validation(qstate, vq)) {
vq->state = vq->final_state;
return 1;
}
vq->trust_anchor = anchors_lookup(ve->anchors, vq->qchase.qname,
vq->qchase.qname_len, vq->qchase.qclass);
if(vq->trust_anchor == NULL) {
/*response isn't under a trust anchor, so we cannot validate.*/
vq->state = vq->final_state;
return 1;
}
/* Determine the signer/lookup name */
val_find_signer(&vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply,
&vq->signer_name, &vq->signer_len);
if(vq->signer_name == NULL) {
lookup_name = vq->qchase.qname;
lookup_len = vq->qchase.qname_len;
} else {
lookup_name = vq->signer_name;
lookup_len = vq->signer_len;
}
vq->key_entry = key_cache_obtain(ve->kcache, lookup_name, lookup_len,
vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->region);
/* if not key, or if keyentry is *above* the trustanchor, i.e.
* the keyentry is based on another (higher) trustanchor */
if(vq->key_entry == NULL || dname_strict_subdomain_c(
vq->trust_anchor->name, vq->key_entry->name)) {
/* fire off a trust anchor priming query. */
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "prime trust anchor");
if(!prime_trust_anchor(qstate, vq, id, vq->trust_anchor))
return val_error(qstate, id);
/* and otherwise, don't continue processing this event.
* (it will be reactivated when the priming query returns). */
vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE;
return 0;
} else if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) {
/* response is under a null key, so we cannot validate
* However, we do set the status to INSECURE, since it is
* essentially proven insecure. */
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
vq->state = vq->final_state;
return 1;
}
/* otherwise, we have our "closest" cached key -- continue
* processing in the next state. */
vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE;
return 1;
}
/**
* Process the FINDKEY state. Generally this just calculates the next name
* to query and either issues a DS or a DNSKEY query. It will check to see
* if the correct key has already been reached, in which case it will
* advance the event to the next state.
*
* @param qstate: query state.
* @param vq: validator query state.
* @param id: module id.
* @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if
* not.
*/
static int
processFindKey(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id)
{
uint8_t* target_key_name, *current_key_name;
size_t target_key_len, current_key_len;
int strip_lab;
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: FindKey");
/* We know that state.key_entry is not a null or bad key -- if it were,
* then previous processing should have directed this event to
* a different state. */
log_assert(vq->key_entry && !key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry) &&
!key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry));
target_key_name = vq->signer_name;
target_key_len = vq->signer_len;
if(!target_key_name) {
target_key_name = vq->qchase.qname;
target_key_len = vq->qchase.qname_len;
}
current_key_name = vq->key_entry->name;
current_key_len = vq->key_entry->namelen;
/* If our current key entry matches our target, then we are done. */
if(query_dname_compare(target_key_name, current_key_name) == 0) {
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
return 1;
}
if(vq->empty_DS_name) {
current_key_name = vq->empty_DS_name;
current_key_len = vq->empty_DS_len;
}
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "current keyname", current_key_name,
LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN);
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "target keyname", target_key_name,
LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN);
/* assert we are walking down the DNS tree */
log_assert(dname_subdomain_c(target_key_name, current_key_name));
/* so this value is >= 0 */
strip_lab = dname_count_labels(target_key_name) -
dname_count_labels(current_key_name) - 1;
log_assert(strip_lab >= 0);
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "striplab %d", strip_lab);
dname_remove_labels(&target_key_name, &target_key_len, strip_lab);
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "next keyname", target_key_name,
LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN);
/* The next step is either to query for the next DS, or to query
* for the next DNSKEY. */
if(!vq->ds_rrset || query_dname_compare(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname,
target_key_name) != 0) {
if(!generate_request(qstate, id, target_key_name,
target_key_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, vq->qchase.qclass)) {
log_err("mem error generating DS request");
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error;
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
/* Otherwise, it is time to query for the DNSKEY */
if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname,
vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY,
vq->qchase.qclass)) {
log_err("mem error generating DNSKEY request");
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error;
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* Process the VALIDATE stage, the init and findkey stages are finished,
* and the right keys are available to validate the response.
* Or, there are no keys available, in order to invalidate the response.
*
* After validation, the status is recorded in the message and rrsets,
* and finished state is started.
*
* @param qstate: query state.
* @param vq: validator query state.
* @param ve: validator shared global environment.
* @param id: module id.
* @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if
* not.
*/
static int
processValidate(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
struct val_env* ve, int id)
{
enum val_classification subtype;
if(!vq->key_entry) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate: no key entry, failed");
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error;
return 0;
}
/* This is the default next state. */
vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
/* signerName being null is the indicator that this response was
* unsigned */
if(vq->signer_name == NULL) {
log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "processValidate: state has no "
"signer name", &vq->qchase);
/* Unsigned responses must be underneath a "null" key entry.*/
if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Unsigned response was proven to "
"be validly INSECURE");
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
return 1;
}
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Could not establish validation of "
"INSECURE status of unsigned response.");
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
return 1;
}
if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) {
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "Could not establish a chain "
"of trust to keys for", vq->key_entry->name,
LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, vq->key_entry->key_class);
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
return 1;
}
if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Verified that response is INSECURE");
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
return 1;
}
subtype = val_classify_response(&vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply);
switch(subtype) {
case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE:
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive response");
validate_positive_response(qstate->env, ve,
&vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry);
break;
case VAL_CLASS_NODATA:
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a nodata response");
validate_nodata_response(qstate->env, ve,
&vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry);
break;
case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR:
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a nxdomain response");
validate_nameerror_response(qstate->env, ve,
&vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry);
break;
case VAL_CLASS_CNAME:
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a cname response");
/*
* TODO special CNAME state or routines
validate_cname_response(vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply,
vq->key_entry);
*/
break;
case VAL_CLASS_ANY:
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive ANY "
"response");
validate_any_response(qstate->env, ve,
&vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry);
break;
default:
log_err("validate: unhandled response subtype: %d",
subtype);
}
return 1;
}
/**
* Handle validator state.
* If a method returns true, the next state is started. If false, then
* processing will stop.
* @param qstate: query state.
* @param vq: validator query state.
* @param ve: validator shared global environment.
* @param id: module id.
*/
static void
val_handle(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
struct val_env* ve, int id)
{
int cont = 1;
while(cont) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "val handle processing q with state %s",
val_state_to_string(vq->state));
switch(vq->state) {
case VAL_INIT_STATE:
cont = processInit(qstate, vq, ve, id);
break;
case VAL_FINDKEY_STATE:
cont = processFindKey(qstate, vq, id);
break;
case VAL_VALIDATE_STATE:
cont = processValidate(qstate, vq, ve, id);
break;
case VAL_FINISHED_STATE:
default:
log_warn("validator: invalid state %d",
vq->state);
cont = 0;
break;
}
}
}
/** validator operate on a query */
static void
val_operate(struct module_qstate* qstate, enum module_ev event, int id,
struct outbound_entry* outbound)
{
struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id];
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validator[module %d] operate: extstate:%s "
"event:%s", id, strextstate(qstate->ext_state[id]),
strmodulevent(event));
log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validator operate: query",
&qstate->qinfo);
if(vq && qstate->qinfo.qname != vq->qchase.qname)
log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validator operate: chased to",
&vq->qchase);
(void)outbound;
if(event == module_event_new ||
(event == module_event_pass && vq == NULL)) {
/* pass request to next module, to get it */
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: pass to next module");
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_module;
return;
}
if(event == module_event_moddone) {
/* check if validation is needed */
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: nextmodule returned");
if(qstate->return_rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
qstate->return_rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN &&
qstate->return_rcode != LDNS_RCODE_YXDOMAIN) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "rcode for error not validated");
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished;
return;
}
if(qstate->query_flags & BIT_CD) {
/* no need to validate this */
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CD bit set: query not validated");
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished;
return;
}
/* create state to start validation */
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; /* override this */
if(!vq) {
vq = val_new(qstate, id);
if(!vq) {
log_err("validator: malloc failure");
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error;
return;
}
}
val_handle(qstate, vq, ve, id);
return;
}
if(event == module_event_pass) {
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; /* override this */
/* continue processing, since val_env exists */
val_handle(qstate, vq, ve, id);
return;
}
log_err("validator: bad event %s", strmodulevent(event));
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error;
return;
}
/**
* Evaluate the response to a priming request.
*
* @param rcode: rcode return value.
* @param msg: message return value (allocated in a the wrong region).
* @param ta: trust anchor.
* @param qstate: qstate that needs key.
* @param id: module id.
* @return new key entry or NULL on allocation failure.
* The key entry will either contain a validated DNSKEY rrset, or
* represent a Null key (query failed, but validation did not), or a
* Bad key (validation failed).
*/
static struct key_entry_key*
primeResponseToKE(int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct trust_anchor* ta,
struct module_qstate* qstate, int id)
{
struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset = NULL;
struct key_entry_key* kkey = NULL;
enum sec_status sec = sec_status_unchecked;
if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
dnskey_rrset = reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep,
ta->name, ta->namelen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY,
ta->dclass);
}
if(!dnskey_rrset) {
log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "failed to prime trust anchor -- "
"could not fetch DNSKEY rrset", &msg->qinfo);
kkey = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, ta->name,
ta->namelen, ta->dclass, NULL_KEY_TTL);
if(!kkey) {
log_err("out of memory: allocate null prime key");
return NULL;
}
key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, kkey);
return kkey;
}
/* attempt to verify with trust anchor DS and DNSKEY */
if(ta->ds_rrset) {
kkey = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(qstate->region, qstate->env, ve,
dnskey_rrset, ta->ds_rrset);
if(!kkey) {
log_err("out of memory: verifying prime DS");
return NULL;
}
if(key_entry_isgood(kkey))
sec = sec_status_secure;
else
sec = sec_status_bogus;
log_info("priming DS result %s", sec_status_to_string(sec));
}
if(sec != sec_status_secure && ta->dnskey_rrset) {
sec = val_verify_rrset(qstate->env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
ta->dnskey_rrset);
if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
kkey = key_entry_create_rrset(qstate->region,
ta->name, ta->namelen, ta->dclass,
dnskey_rrset);
if(!kkey) {
log_err("out of memory: allocate primed key");
return NULL;
}
}
}
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "failed to prime trust anchor -- "
"could not fetch DNSKEY rrset", &msg->qinfo);
/* NOTE: in this case, we should probably reject the trust
* anchor for longer, perhaps forever. */
kkey = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, ta->name,
ta->namelen, ta->dclass, NULL_KEY_TTL);
if(!kkey) {
log_err("out of memory: allocate null prime key");
return NULL;
}
key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, kkey);
return kkey;
}
log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully primed trust anchor",
&msg->qinfo);
/* store the freshly primed entry in the cache */
key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, kkey);
return kkey;
}
/**
* In inform supers, with the resulting message and rcode and the current
* keyset in the super state, validate the DS response, returning a KeyEntry.
*
* @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DS.
* @param vq: validator query state
* @param id: module id.
* @param rcode: rcode result value.
* @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK).
* @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info.
* @param ke: the key entry to return. It returns
* bad if the DS response fails to validate, null if the
* DS response indicated an end to secure space, good if the DS
* validated. It returns null if the DS response indicated that the
* request wasn't a delegation point.
* @return 0 on servfail error (malloc failure).
*/
static int
ds_response_to_ke(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo,
struct key_entry_key** ke)
{
struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
enum val_classification subtype;
if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
/* errors here pretty much break validation */
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS response was error, thus bogus");
goto return_bogus;
}
subtype = val_classify_response(qinfo, msg->rep);
if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) {
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds;
enum sec_status sec;
ds = reply_find_answer_rrset(qinfo, msg->rep);
/* If there was no DS rrset, then we have mis-classified
* this message. */
if(!ds) {
log_warn("internal error: POSITIVE DS response was "
"missing DS.");
goto return_bogus;
}
/* Verify only returns BOGUS or SECURE. If the rrset is
* bogus, then we are done. */
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, ds,
vq->key_entry);
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS rrset in DS response did "
"not verify");
goto return_bogus;
}
/* If the DS rrset validates, we still have to make sure
* that they are usable. */
if(!val_dsset_isusable(ds)) {
/* If they aren't usable, then we treat it like
* there was no DS. */
*ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region,
qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass,
ub_packed_rrset_ttl(ds));
return (*ke) != NULL;
}
/* Otherwise, we return the positive response. */
log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "DS rrset was good.", qinfo);
*ke = key_entry_create_rrset(qstate->region,
qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, ds);
return (*ke) != NULL;
} else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA) {
/* NODATA means that the qname exists, but that there was
* no DS. This is a pretty normal case. */
uint32_t proof_ttl = 0;
/* Try to prove absence of the DS with NSEC */
enum sec_status sec = val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(
qstate->env, ve, qinfo, msg->rep, vq->key_entry,
&proof_ttl);
switch(sec) {
case sec_status_secure:
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC RRset for the "
"referral proved no DS.");
*ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region,
qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len,
qinfo->qclass, proof_ttl);
return (*ke) != NULL;
case sec_status_insecure:
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC RRset for the "
"referral proved not a delegation point");
*ke = NULL;
return 1;
case sec_status_bogus:
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC RRset for the "
"referral did not prove no DS.");
goto return_bogus;
case sec_status_unchecked:
default:
/* NSEC proof did not work, try next */
break;
}
/* Or it could be using NSEC3. TODO */
/* Apparently, no available NSEC/NSEC3 proved NODATA, so
* this is BOGUS. */
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS ran out of options, so return bogus");
goto return_bogus;
} else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS response was NAMEERROR, thus bogus.");
goto return_bogus;
} else {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Encountered an unhandled type of "
"DS response, thus bogus.");
return_bogus:
*ke = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, qinfo->qname,
qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass);
return (*ke) != NULL;
}
/* unreachable */
log_assert(0);
}
/**
* Process DS response. Called from inform_supers.
* Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks
* for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead
* set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon.
* Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super.
*
* @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DS.
* @param vq: validator query state
* @param id: module id.
* @param rcode: rcode result value.
* @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK).
* @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info.
*/
static void
process_ds_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo)
{
struct key_entry_key* dske = NULL;
if(!ds_response_to_ke(qstate, vq, id, rcode, msg, qinfo, &dske)) {
log_err("malloc failure in DStoKE");
vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
return;
}
if(dske == NULL) {
vq->empty_DS_name = qinfo->qname;
vq->empty_DS_len = qinfo->qname_len;
/* ds response indicated that we aren't on a delegation point.
* Keep the forState.state on FINDKEY. */
} else if(key_entry_isgood(dske)) {
vq->ds_rrset = key_entry_get_rrset(dske, qstate->region);
if(!vq->ds_rrset) {
log_err("malloc failure in process DS");
vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
return;
}
/* Keep the forState.state on FINDKEY. */
} else {
/* NOTE: the reason for the DS to be not good (that is,
* either bad or null) should have been logged by
* dsResponseToKE. */
vq->key_entry = dske;
/* The FINDKEY phase has ended, so move on. */
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
}
}
/**
* Process DNSKEY response. Called from inform_supers.
* Sets the key entry in the state.
* Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks
* for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead
* set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon.
* Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super.
*
* @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DNSKEY.
* @param vq: validator query state
* @param id: module id.
* @param rcode: rcode result value.
* @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK).
* @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info.
*/
static void
process_dnskey_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo)
{
struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey = NULL;
if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR)
dnskey = reply_find_answer_rrset(qinfo, msg->rep);
if(dnskey == NULL) {
/* bad response */
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Missing DNSKEY RRset in response to "
"DNSKEY query.");
vq->key_entry = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region,
qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass);
if(!vq->key_entry) {
log_err("alloc failure in missing dnskey response");
/* key_entry is NULL for failure in Validate */
}
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
return;
}
if(!vq->ds_rrset) {
log_err("internal error: no DS rrset for new DNSKEY response");
vq->key_entry = NULL;
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
return;
}
vq->key_entry = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(qstate->region, qstate->env,
ve, dnskey, vq->ds_rrset);
if(!vq->key_entry) {
log_err("out of memory in verify new DNSKEYs");
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
return;
}
/* If the key entry isBad or isNull, then we can move on to the next
* state. */
if(!key_entry_isgood(vq->key_entry)) {
if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry))
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Did not match a DS to a DNSKEY, "
"thus bogus.");
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
return;
}
/* The DNSKEY validated, so cache it as a trusted key rrset. */
key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry);
/* If good, we stay in the FINDKEY state. */
}
/**
* Process prime response
* Sets the key entry in the state.
*
* @param qstate: query state that is validating and primed a trust anchor.
* @param vq: validator query state
* @param id: module id.
* @param rcode: rcode result value.
* @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK).
*/
static void
process_prime_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg)
{
/* Fetch and validate the keyEntry that corresponds to the
* current trust anchor. */
vq->key_entry = primeResponseToKE(rcode, msg, vq->trust_anchor,
qstate, id);
/* If the result of the prime is a null key, skip the FINDKEY state.*/
if(!vq->key_entry || key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) {
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
}
/* the qstate will be reactivated after inform_super is done */
}
/**
* inform validator super.
*
* @param qstate: query state that finished.
* @param id: module id.
* @param super: the qstate to inform.
*/
static void
val_inform_super(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id,
struct module_qstate* super)
{
struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)super->minfo[id];
log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: inform_super, sub is",
&qstate->qinfo);
log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "super is", &super->qinfo);
if(!vq) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "super: has no validator state");
return;
}
if(vq->wait_prime_ta) {
vq->wait_prime_ta = 0;
process_prime_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode,
qstate->return_msg);
return;
}
if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) {
process_ds_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode,
qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo);
return;
} else if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY) {
process_dnskey_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode,
qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo);
return;
}
log_err("internal error in validator: no inform_supers possible");
}
/** validator cleanup query state */
static void
val_clear(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id)
{
if(!qstate)
return;
/* everything is allocated in the region, so assign NULL */
qstate->minfo[id] = NULL;
}
/**
* The validator function block
*/
static struct module_func_block val_block = {
"validator",
&val_init, &val_deinit, &val_operate, &val_inform_super, &val_clear
};
struct module_func_block*
val_get_funcblock()
{
return &val_block;
}
const char*
val_state_to_string(enum val_state state)
{
switch(state) {
case VAL_INIT_STATE: return "VAL_INIT_STATE";
case VAL_FINDKEY_STATE: return "VAL_FINDKEY_STATE";
case VAL_VALIDATE_STATE: return "VAL_VALIDATE_STATE";
case VAL_FINISHED_STATE: return "VAL_FINISHED_STATE";
}
return "UNKNOWN VALIDATOR STATE";
}