Implement FR #72510: systemd service should be hardened

This commit is contained in:
Craig Andrews 2016-06-28 22:08:45 +02:00 committed by Christoph M. Becker
parent 4d0a2f68a9
commit 40c4d7f182
2 changed files with 57 additions and 0 deletions

3
NEWS
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@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ PHP NEWS
- Date:
. Fixed bug #75232 (print_r of DateTime creating side-effect). (Nikita)
- FPM:
. Implemented FR #72510 (systemd service should be hardened). (Craig Andrews)
- GD:
. Fixed bug #73291 (imagecropauto() $threshold differs from external libgd).
(cmb)

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@ -11,7 +11,61 @@ Type=@php_fpm_systemd@
PIDFile=@EXPANDED_LOCALSTATEDIR@/run/php-fpm.pid
ExecStart=@EXPANDED_SBINDIR@/php-fpm --nodaemonize --fpm-config @EXPANDED_SYSCONFDIR@/php-fpm.conf
ExecReload=/bin/kill -USR2 $MAINPID
# Set up a new file system namespace and mounts private /tmp and /var/tmp directories
# so this service cannot access the global directories and other processes cannot
# access this service's directories.
PrivateTmp=true
# The directories /home, /root and /run/user are made inaccessible and empty for processes
# invoked by this unit.
ProtectHome=true
# Mounts the /usr, /boot, and /etc directories read-only for processes invoked by this unit.
ProtectSystem=full
# Ensures that the service process and all its children can never gain new privileges
NoNewPrivileges=true
# Sets up a new /dev namespace for the executed processes and only adds API pseudo devices
# such as /dev/null, /dev/zero or /dev/random (as well as the pseudo TTY subsystem) to it,
# but no physical devices such as /dev/sda.
PrivateDevices=true
# Required for dropping privileges and running as a different user
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_SETGID CAP_SETUID
# Attempts to create memory mappings that are writable and executable at the same time,
# or to change existing memory mappings to become executable are prohibited.
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
# Explicit module loading will be denied. This allows to turn off module load and unload
# operations on modular kernels. It is recommended to turn this on for most services that
# do not need special file systems or extra kernel modules to work.
ProtectKernelModules=true
# Kernel variables accessible through /proc/sys, /sys, /proc/sysrq-trigger, /proc/latency_stats,
# /proc/acpi, /proc/timer_stats, /proc/fs and /proc/irq will be made read-only to all processes
# of the unit. Usually, tunable kernel variables should only be written at boot-time, with the
# sysctl.d(5) mechanism. Almost no services need to write to these at runtime; it is hence
# recommended to turn this on for most services.
ProtectKernelTunables=true
# The Linux Control Groups (cgroups(7)) hierarchies accessible through /sys/fs/cgroup will be
# made read-only to all processes of the unit. Except for container managers no services should
# require write access to the control groups hierarchies; it is hence recommended to turn this on
# for most services
ProtectControlGroups=true
# Any attempts to enable realtime scheduling in a process of the unit are refused.
RestrictRealtime=true
# Restricts the set of socket address families accessible to the processes of this unit.
# Protects against vulnerabilities such as CVE-2016-8655
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX
# Takes away the ability to create or manage any kind of namespace
RestrictNamespaces=true
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target