tests: added test with proxy-protocol

That tests operation under haproxy with proxy-protocol without docker.

Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
This commit is contained in:
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos 2018-03-25 18:56:19 +02:00
parent 5c719b4264
commit 63b7e81e87
6 changed files with 307 additions and 2 deletions

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@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ libnss-wrapper / nss_wrapper
libsocket-wrapper / socket_wrapper
gss-ntlmssp / gssntlmssp
libpam-oath / pam_oath
haproxy / haproxy
```
See [README-radius](doc/README-radius.md) for more information on Radius

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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST = certs/ca-key.pem certs/ca.pem common.sh certs/server-cert.pem \
data/test-otp-cert.config data/test-otp.oath test-otp-cert data/test-otp.passwd \
data/test-otp.config data/test-cert-opt-pass.config data/test-gssapi-opt-pass.config \
certs/server-key-secp521r1.pem certs/server-cert-secp521r1.pem data/test-vhost-pass-cert.config \
data/vhost.hosts data/multiple-routes.config
data/vhost.hosts data/multiple-routes.config data/haproxy-auth.cfg data/test-haproxy-auth.config
SUBDIRS = docker-ocserv docker-kerberos
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ dist_check_SCRIPTS += test-pass test-pass-cert test-cert test-group-pass \
test-pass-group-cert test-pass-group-cert-no-pass test-sighup \
test-enc-key test-sighup-key-change test-get-cert test-san-cert \
test-gssapi test-pass-opt-cert test-cert-opt-pass test-gssapi-opt-pass \
test-gssapi-opt-cert
test-gssapi-opt-cert haproxy-auth
if HAVE_CWRAP_PAM
dist_check_SCRIPTS += test-pam test-pam-noauth

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@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ update_config() {
sed -i 's|@SRCDIR@|'${srcdir}'|g' "$file.$$.tmp"
sed -i 's|@OTP_FILE@|'${OTP_FILE}'|g' "$file.$$.tmp"
sed -i 's|@CRLNAME@|'${CRLNAME}'|g' "$file.$$.tmp"
sed -i 's|@PORT@|'${PORT}'|g' "$file.$$.tmp"
sed -i 's|@ADDRESS@|'${ADDRESS}'|g' "$file.$$.tmp"
CONFIG="$file.$$.tmp"
}

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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
global
user haproxy
group haproxy
#daemon
# Default SSL material locations
#ca-base /etc/ssl/certs
#crt-base /etc/ssl/private
ssl-default-bind-ciphers kEECDH+aRSA+AES:kRSA+AES:+AES256:RC4-SHA:!kEDH:!LOW:!EXP:!MD5:!aNULL:!eNULL
defaults
log global
mode http
option dontlognull
timeout connect 5000
timeout client 50000
timeout server 50000
frontend ssl
mode tcp
bind *:@HAPORT@
tcp-request inspect-delay 5s
tcp-request content accept if { req.ssl_hello_type 1 }
use_backend ocserv
backend ocserv
mode tcp
option ssl-hello-chk
server server-vpn @ADDRESS@:@PORT@ send-proxy-v2

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@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
# User authentication method. Could be set multiple times and in that case
# all should succeed.
# Options: certificate, pam.
#auth = "certificate"
auth = "plain[@SRCDIR@/data/test1.passwd]"
#auth = "pam"
max-ban-score = 0
# A banner to be displayed on clients
#banner = "Welcome"
# Use listen-host to limit to specific IPs or to the IPs of a provided hostname.
#listen-host = [IP|HOSTNAME]
use-dbus = no
# Limit the number of clients. Unset or set to zero for unlimited.
#max-clients = 1024
max-clients = 16
listen-proxy-proto = true
# Limit the number of client connections to one every X milliseconds
# (X is the provided value). Set to zero for no limit.
#rate-limit-ms = 100
# Limit the number of identical clients (i.e., users connecting multiple times)
# Unset or set to zero for unlimited.
max-same-clients = 2
# TCP and UDP port number
tcp-port = @PORT@
udp-port = @PORT@
# Keepalive in seconds
keepalive = 32400
# Dead peer detection in seconds
dpd = 440
# MTU discovery (DPD must be enabled)
try-mtu-discovery = false
# The key and the certificates of the server
# The key may be a file, or any URL supported by GnuTLS (e.g.,
# tpmkey:uuid=xxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxx;storage=user
# or pkcs11:object=my-vpn-key;object-type=private)
#
# There may be multiple certificate and key pairs and each key
# should correspond to the preceding certificate.
server-cert = @SRCDIR@/certs/server-cert.pem
server-key = @SRCDIR@/certs/server-key.pem
# Diffie-Hellman parameters. Only needed if you require support
# for the DHE ciphersuites (by default this server supports ECDHE).
# Can be generated using:
# certtool --generate-dh-params --outfile /path/to/dh.pem
#dh-params = /path/to/dh.pem
# If you have a certificate from a CA that provides an OCSP
# service you may provide a fresh OCSP status response within
# the TLS handshake. That will prevent the client from connecting
# independently on the OCSP server.
# You can update this response periodically using:
# ocsptool --ask --load-cert=your_cert --load-issuer=your_ca --outfile response
# Make sure that you replace the following file in an atomic way.
#ocsp-response = /path/to/ocsp.der
# In case PKCS #11 or TPM keys are used the PINs should be available
# in files. The srk-pin-file is applicable to TPM keys only (It's the storage
# root key).
#pin-file = /path/to/pin.txt
#srk-pin-file = /path/to/srkpin.txt
# The Certificate Authority that will be used
# to verify clients if certificate authentication
# is set.
#ca-cert = /path/to/ca.pem
# The object identifier that will be used to read the user ID in the client certificate.
# The object identifier should be part of the certificate's DN
# Useful OIDs are:
# CN = 2.5.4.3, UID = 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1
#cert-user-oid = 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1
# The object identifier that will be used to read the user group in the client
# certificate. The object identifier should be part of the certificate's DN
# Useful OIDs are:
# OU (organizational unit) = 2.5.4.11
#cert-group-oid = 2.5.4.11
# A revocation list of ca-cert is set
#crl = /path/to/crl.pem
# GnuTLS priority string
tls-priorities = "PERFORMANCE:%SERVER_PRECEDENCE:%COMPAT"
# To enforce perfect forward secrecy (PFS) on the main channel.
#tls-priorities = "NORMAL:%SERVER_PRECEDENCE:%COMPAT:-RSA"
# The time (in seconds) that a client is allowed to stay connected prior
# to authentication
auth-timeout = 40
# The time (in seconds) that a client is not allowed to reconnect after
# a failed authentication attempt.
#min-reauth-time = 2
# Cookie validity time (in seconds)
# Once a client is authenticated he's provided a cookie with
# which he can reconnect. This option sets the maximum lifetime
# of that cookie.
cookie-validity = 172800
# Script to call when a client connects and obtains an IP
# Parameters are passed on the environment.
# REASON, USERNAME, GROUPNAME, HOSTNAME (the hostname selected by client),
# DEVICE, IP_REAL (the real IP of the client), IP_LOCAL (the local IP
# in the P-t-P connection), IP_REMOTE (the VPN IP of the client). REASON
# may be "connect" or "disconnect".
#connect-script = /usr/bin/myscript
#disconnect-script = /usr/bin/myscript
# UTMP
use-utmp = true
# PID file
pid-file = ./ocserv.pid
# The default server directory. Does not require any devices present.
#chroot-dir = /path/to/chroot
# socket file used for IPC, will be appended with .PID
# It must be accessible within the chroot environment (if any)
socket-file = ./ocserv-socket
# The user the worker processes will be run as. It should be
# unique (no other services run as this user).
run-as-user = @USERNAME@
run-as-group = @GROUP@
# Network settings
device = vpns
# The default domain to be advertised
default-domain = example.com
ipv4-network = 192.168.1.0
ipv4-netmask = 255.255.255.0
# Use the keywork local to advertize the local P-t-P address as DNS server
ipv4-dns = 192.168.1.1
# The NBNS server (if any)
#ipv4-nbns = 192.168.2.3
#ipv6-address =
#ipv6-mask =
#ipv6-dns =
# Prior to leasing any IP from the pool ping it to verify that
# it is not in use by another (unrelated to this server) host.
ping-leases = false
# Leave empty to assign the default MTU of the device
# mtu =
route = 192.168.1.0/255.255.255.0
#route = 192.168.5.0/255.255.255.0
#
# The following options are for (experimental) AnyConnect client
# compatibility. They are only available if the server is built
# with --enable-anyconnect
#
# Client profile xml. A sample file exists in doc/profile.xml.
# This file must be accessible from inside the worker's chroot.
# The profile is ignored by the openconnect client.
#user-profile = profile.xml
# Unless set to false it is required for clients to present their
# certificate even if they are authenticating via a previously granted
# cookie. Legacy CISCO clients do not do that, and thus this option
# should be set for them.
#always-require-cert = false

82
tests/haproxy-auth Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
#!/bin/sh
#
# Copyright (C) 2013 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
#
# This file is part of ocserv.
#
# ocserv is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
# Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at
# your option) any later version.
#
# ocserv is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with GnuTLS; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
# Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
SERV="${SERV:-../src/ocserv}"
srcdir=${srcdir:-.}
NO_NEED_ROOT=1
PORT=4466
HAPORT=4467
PIDFILE=ocserv-pid.$$.tmp
PATH=${PATH}:/usr/sbin
HACONFIG=haproxy.conf.$$.tmp
HAPROXY=$(which haproxy)
. `dirname $0`/common.sh
if test -z "${HAPROXY}";then
echo "no haproxy present"
exit 77
fi
echo "Testing ocserv connection via haproxy... "
update_config test-haproxy-auth.config
launch_sr_server -d 1 -p ${PIDFILE} -f -c ${CONFIG} & PID=$!
wait_server ${PID}
sed -e 's|@HAPORT@|'${HAPORT}'|g' -e 's|@PORT@|'${PORT}'|g' -e 's|@ADDRESS@|'${ADDRESS}'|g' ${srcdir}/data/haproxy-auth.cfg >${HACONFIG}
LD_PRELOAD=libsocket_wrapper.so:libuid_wrapper.so UID_WRAPPER=1 UID_WRAPPER_ROOT=1 ${HAPROXY} -f ${HACONFIG} -d & HAPID=$!
wait_server ${HAPID}
echo "Connecting to obtain cookie... "
( echo "test" | LD_PRELOAD=libsocket_wrapper.so ${OPENCONNECT} -q ${ADDRESS}:${HAPORT} -u test --servercert=d66b507ae074d03b02eafca40d35f87dd81049d3 --cookieonly )
if test $? != 0;then
kill ${HAPID}
fail ${PID} "Could not receive cookie from server"
fi
# Restart haproxy and reconnect.
kill ${HAPID}
sleep 2
LD_PRELOAD=libsocket_wrapper.so:libuid_wrapper.so UID_WRAPPER=1 UID_WRAPPER_ROOT=1 ${HAPROXY} -f ${HACONFIG} -d & HAPID=$!
wait_server ${HAPID}
echo "Re-connecting to obtain cookie after haproxy restart... "
( echo "test" | LD_PRELOAD=libsocket_wrapper.so ${OPENCONNECT} -q ${ADDRESS}:${HAPORT} -u test --servercert=d66b507ae074d03b02eafca40d35f87dd81049d3 --cookieonly )
if test $? != 0;then
kill ${HAPID}
fail ${PID} "Could not receive cookie from server"
fi
kill ${HAPID}
if ! test -f ${PIDFILE};then
fail ${PID} "Could not find pid file ${PIDFILE}"
fi
echo "Cleaning up..."
rm -f ${HACONFIG}
cleanup
exit 0